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PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #4511/01 3291147
ZNY SSSS ZZH
P 251147Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7690
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 004511

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WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND; NSC FOR HINNEN; DOE FOR IE;
STATE FOR EB/ESC, NEA/ARP, PM/PPA, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016

TAGS: [EPET](#) [ENRG](#) [PTER](#) [KU](#) [OIL](#) [SECTOR](#)

SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT
CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

REF: A. KUWAIT 4425

[1B.](#) KUWAIT 3071

[1C.](#) 05 KUWAIT 4400

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[11.](#) (S/NF) SUMMARY: On 14 November, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Frances Fragos Townsend received a briefing from Director of the Kuwait National Security Bureau (NSB) Shaykh Thamer Ali A. Al-Salem Al-Sabah and senior managers of Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) regarding the status of Kuwait's critical energy infrastructure security and plans for improvements. Shaykh Thamer outlined the responsibilities and organizational structure of the agencies tasked with managing Kuwait's energy infrastructure security, described existing and planned security systems and hardware installations, and referred to the development of standard operating procedures and doctrine. The briefing was followed by a tour of selected security facilities at KNPC's Shuaiba and Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery complexes including a crisis response center, a refinery control room, and perimeter security installations. Townsend emphasized the importance of a clear doctrine and unified chain of command and control, integrated communications, integrated response procedures, including the evacuation of surrounding populations if necessary, and frequent practice and refinement of procedures through repeated drills and exercises. The NSB and KNPC briefers acknowledged that they had identified the same priorities and were in the process of installing the systems and developing the training and procedures needed to better deter possible threats and respond to major incidents whether they be terrorist attacks or industrial accidents. The Kuwaitis announced plans to conduct a major security exercise in December. END SUMMARY.

[12.](#) (S/NF) On 14 November, APHSCT Townsend received a briefing led by Shaykh Thamer, Director of the Kuwait National Security Bureau and supported by KNPC Deputy Managing Director Suhail Yusef Bu-Grace and the Deputy Managing Directors of Kuwait's three refineries, Husain Ismail of Shuaiba, Asa'ad Ahmad Al-Saad of Mina-Al-Ahmadi, and Abdul Mohsen Ali Khajah of Mina Al-Abdulla. The briefers explained that overall responsibility for energy infrastructure security was assigned to a high-level, inter-ministerial Security Decision Follow-up Committee. This committee is led by the President of the NSB, Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd, and reports directly to the Council of

Ministers. The KNPC Deputy explained that Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), which manages all of Kuwait's oil industry, is in the process of consolidating security functions and organizations across all of its subsidiaries. A new KPC subsidiary called the Oil Sector Services Company (OSSCo) is gradually assuming the security responsibilities that were previously managed separately by each of the individual subsidiaries including the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC), Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC), and Petrochemical Industries Company (PIC). OSSCo plans to gradually acquire these management responsibilities over a period of twelve to eighteen months. The security force for the oil sector is currently comprised of personnel from the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard, the Coast Guard and security personnel employed by each of the KPC subsidiaries. This last group is not allowed to carry arms. OSSCo is also in the process of establishing a shore protection force to enhance the security of the seaward approaches to the refineries and loading terminals. Although OSSCo will eventually assume overall responsibility for security within KPC, the company is not expected to have control over Interior Ministry personnel.

¶3. (S/NF) Shaykh Thamer explained that in the event of a security incident, the MOI assumes operational control, whereas in the event of an industrial incident, the oil company operations managers take control. Townsend suggested that this might be an artificial distinction and said that one lesson learned in the U.S. was that an integrated response was required including integrated communications and an integrated command-and-control structure. The NSB and KNPC briefers acknowledged the need for greater integration and said that they were in the

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process of installing the communications systems and establishing the standard operating procedures and protocols required to enable this level of integration. When Townsend asked about the quality of information sharing and management across facilities and companies, including the effective dissemination of threat information, the NSB and KNPC reps answered that there is currently no effective system for managing information. They said that moving from the current "ad-hoc" approach to a more systematic one was a high priority. When Townsend asked about the development of crisis management doctrine, the Kuwaitis replied that the development and reinforcement of standard operating procedures is currently their greatest focus of activity. They plan to test these systems and procedures during a major security exercise to be conducted in December. Townsend stressed the importance of drills and exercises and also emphasized the need to be prepared to coordinate with local authorities during a major incident due to the proximity of the refineries to the city of Fahaheel.

¶4. (S/NF) With regard to hardware and systems, Shaykh Thamer explained that each of the individual KPC subsidiaries had been working with its own private security contractor to identify gaps and prioritize hardware installations to fill those gaps. The refineries have already completed a major upgrade of perimeter fencing (now three layers instead of one surrounding the entire facility and extending into the sea), a large-scale CCTV installation, placement of security buoys and a radar system in the maritime exclusion zone, and the establishment of a temporary Crisis Center. The construction of a high-tech, permanent crisis center is part of the plan for a fully-integrated security system scheduled to be completed by 2009-2010.

¶ 5. (S/NF) Following the briefing, Shaykh Thamer led Townsend on a tour of some of the security installations at the Shuaiba and Mina-Al-Ahmadi refinery complexes. This began with a tour of the temporary Crisis Center which is manned 24-hours by a 5-person security watch section including KNPC and Ministry of Interior personnel. From the Crisis Center, watchstanders can control and monitor an extensive network of security cameras, perimeter alarms, electrified fences, and radar. They can also communicate with the guard force, security agencies, and the refinery control room. En route to the next stop, the motorcade traveled along the perimeter to observe the triple-layer barrier, electrified fence, and perimeter cameras. The next stop was the control center for the Shuaiba refinery which was manned by about 20 personnel who monitor plant operations and equipment status. The monitoring and communications equipment appeared modern and comprehensive. The final stop was an electronics shed near the perimeter that contained processing equipment and an operator-interface for the perimeter surveillance equipment, including cameras and alarms. A security contractor demonstrated how the system responds to a perimeter alarm by alerting the operator, indicating the location of the intrusion, and slaving a camera to the location.

¶ 6. (S/NF) In separate meetings with APHSCT Townsend (septel) and earlier with the Ambassador (ref. A), President of the Kuwait National Security Bureau and former Energy Minister Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd expressed the desire to cooperate with the USG to enhance Kuwait's critical energy infrastructure as a top priority under the Gulf Security Dialogue.

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